Cambridge University Press, United States of America, 2003
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Digital Copy
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5
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0
Synopsis
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Much recent philosophy of mind has fallen for a mistaken conception of
the nature of psychological concepts. It has assumed too much similarity
between psychological judgements and those of natural science, and has
thus overlooked the centrality of the fact that other people are not just
objects we may try to predict and control but fellow creatures with whom
we talk and co-operate.
In this collection of essays, Jane Heal argues that central to our ability
to arrive at views about others’ thoughts is not knowledge of some theory
of the mind but rather an ability to imagine alternative worlds and how
things appear from another person’s point of view. She then considers the
implications of this account for such questions as how we represent others’
thoughts, the shape of psychological concepts, the nature of rationality
and the possibility of first-person authority.
This book should appeal to students and professionals in philosophy of
mind and philosophy of language.
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